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The Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) is a new axiomatic approach in set theory formulated
by Sy-D. Friedman. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the hypothesis, and discuss
it with respect to the current debate on the consequences of independence results in set
theory.
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to bring the InnerModel Hypothesis (IMH), an axiomatic approach formulated by the second author
in [5], into the current debate on the implications of independence results in set theory. We argue that the IMH provides
an alternative to the two main contenders in this debate: the view that the universe of sets is inherently undetermined, its
essential features being exhausted by the axioms of ZFC the system of Zermelo–Fraenkel plus the Axiom of Choice, and
the opposing view that the next step toward the goal of making our knowledge of the universe of sets more determinate
consists in the search for a suitable extension of the system ZFC + large cardinal axioms. Both perspectives are objectionable
in principle, and the IMH confirms this, in fact.
A brief overview of the current situation with regard to independence in set theory is given in Section 2. Section 3
illustrates the main views in the current debate on the implications of independence phenomena. Criticism against these
views is presented in Section 4, while the implications of the IMH are discussed in Section 5.
Both authors wish to thank the John Templeton Foundation for its generous support of this work in the framework of the
Infinity Project at the Centre de Recerca Matemàtica, Bellaterra, Spain.
2. A puzzling state of affairs
As a consequence of Gödel’s construction of the innermodel L and Cohen’s introduction of forcing techniques in set theory,
the existence of alternative universes satisfying the accepted axioms (i.e., the axioms of the system ZFC) has emerged as an
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inescapable fact. In addition to ZFC, the universe L of constructible sets satisfies the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis
(GCH) (and therefore the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis (SCH)), the assertion that there is a definable non-measurable set
of reals, and the Singular Square Principle; it fails to satisfy the Suslin Hypothesis, the Whitehead conjecture, the Borel
Conjecture, and the existence of a Borel bijection between any two non-Borel analytic sets.1 On the other hand, many of
these principles behave differently in forcing extensions of L and, relative to the existence of large cardinals, they all behave
differently in some model of ZFC.2
As a natural move in the attempt to decide statements independent from ZFC and thereby make our picture of the
universe of sets more determinate, candidate axioms for extending ZFC have been proposed and investigated. In line with a
suggestion of Gödel, a prominent role in this investigation has been played by large cardinal axioms.3 With reference to such
axioms, Gödel says:
It is not impossible that [. . . ] some completeness theorem would hold which would say that every proposition
expressible in set theory is decidable from the present axioms plus some true assertion about the largeness of the
universe of all sets. [3, 150–3]
What came to be known as ‘‘Gödel’s program for new axioms’’ did not however produce the desired results as far
as independence is concerned. The statement of greatest interest which is independent from ZFC, Cantor’s Continuum
Hypothesis, is also independent from ‘‘ZFC + large cardinal axioms’’. But a relevant general fact emerged: the study of
large cardinal axioms took the form of a strictly mathematical venture (‘‘the theory is assumed and theorems are proved
in the ordinary mathematical manner’’, [4], ix), and itsmathematical successwas used as a source of evidence in set theory.
Success is meant here as Gödel intended it, i.e., as consisting in axioms being ‘‘fruitful in consequences, exactly in ‘verifiable’
consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable without the new axiom,whose proofs bymeans of the new axiom, however,
are considerably simpler and easier to discover [. . . ]’’,4 as well as in axioms shedding light ‘‘upon a whole discipline, and
furnishing [. . . ] powerful methods for solving given problems’’ [7, 183].5
It is however worth noting that mathematical success can be reasonably ascribed to extensions of ZFC incompatible
with ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’. ZFC+ V = L, for instance, is fruitful in consequences, furnishes powerful methods for
solving problems, and introduces the concept of constructibility, important throughout set theory.6 Of course this theory is
incompatible with ‘‘ZFC+ there exists a measurable cardinal’’.7
How the mathematical success of large cardinal axioms is related to the program of making the picture of the set-
theoretical universe more determinate – and, more generally, to the aim of producing definitive set-theoretical hypotheses
– is discussed in the next two sections.
3. Reactions
Faced with the situation described in Section 2, set-theorists show diverse reactions. The existence of mutually
incompatible, successful extensions of ZFC led some to the conclusion that the notion of a set-theoretic universe is inherently
undetermined. This position is clearly expressed by Shelah in [15]:
I do not feel ‘‘a universe of ZFC’’ is like ‘‘the Sun’’, it is rather like ‘‘a human being’’ or ‘‘a human being of some fixed
nationality.’’ [. . . ] You may think ‘‘does CH, i.e., 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 hold?’’ is like ‘‘Can a typical American be Catholic?’’[15, 211]
A different attitude is endorsed by those who, due to the success of large cardinal axioms, regard ZFC as ‘‘the twentieth
century choice’’ for the axioms of set theory and consider ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’ to be the contemporary theory of
sets, ‘‘to be adopted by all, as part of a broadest point of view’’.8 In fact, these authors do not draw conclusions similar to
Shelah’s from the fact that large cardinals are preserved under forcing, and hence models of ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’
exist in which mutually exclusive propositions are true. They put stress not on the failure of large cardinals to produce a
determinate picture of the universe of sets but instead on the mathematical success of large cardinal axioms, and explicitly
1 The GCH is the assertion that, for any cardinal number κ , 2κ = κ+ , while the SCH, implied by the GCH, is the same assertion for κ a singular strong
limit cardinal. For the other principles mentioned, see [12].
2 Specifically, there are forcing extensions of L in which the GCH is false, definable sets of reals aremeasurable, and the Suslin Hypothesis, theWhitehead
Conjecture, and the Borel Conjecture are true. Models of the negation of the SCH, the negation of the Singular Square Principle, and the existence of a Borel
bijection between any two non-Borel analytic sets can be obtained by assuming the existence of a hypermeasurable cardinal, a supercompact cardinal, and
a measurable cardinal, respectively.
3 Large cardinal axioms assert the existence of cardinals κ with various strong properties, always implying that the family of sets of hereditary cardinality
<κ is a model of ZFC.
4 ‘‘[. . . ] and make it possible to condense into one proof many different proofs’’, [7], 183.
5 On the success of large cardinal axioms, see [10] and [1].
6 Inner and core models for large cardinals can be regarded as generalizations of the universe L of constructible sets. See [13].
7 That if ameasurable cardinal exists, then V ≠ Lwas proved by Scott in 1961. See [12] for details.
8 See, respectively, [18] and [16], where the point is made that the ‘‘broadest point of view’’ proviso is meant to exclude from attention the temporary
adoption of restrictive assumptions as a convenient device for avoiding irrelevant structure’’ (e.g., ‘‘V = L is often temporarily assumed for such reasons
by set-theorists who do not believe it [. . . ]’’, [16], 422).
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take this as providing evidence for the correctness (or truth) of these axioms, even regarding them as definitive hypotheses.9
At the same time, the hope is expressed that new correct (true) axioms will emerge that decide questions independent
from the system ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinals’’. As a result, the program of making the picture of the set-theoretical universe more
determinate is placed in the restricted form: find suitable axiomatic extensions of ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinals’’.
This forms part of Woodin’s conclusions in [18], where an axiomatic proposal is advanced that is intended to play the
same role with regard to third-order number theory, in which the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) can be formulated, which is
played by large cardinal axioms with regard to second-order number theory.10
So, is the Continuum Hypothesis solvable? Perhaps I am not completely confident that the ‘‘solution’’ I have sketched
is the solution, but it is for me convincing evidence that there is a solution. [. . . ] The universe of all sets is a large place.
We have just barely begun to understand it [18, 690].
Both Shelah’s and Woodin’s positions are not immune to criticism. Objections to them are advanced in the next section.
4. Criticism
Let us start with positions like those expressed by Woodin regarding extensions of ‘‘ZFC + large cardinal axioms’’.
According to them, successful, hence correct (true), set-theoretic axioms (large cardinal axioms) have been discovered that
settle some notable questions independent from ZFC. This implies that the program for making the picture of the universe
more determined cannot but consist in extending ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’. We argue that the implication ‘‘success→
correctness (or truth)’’ presupposed by this view is objectionable, and makes it ultimately untenable.
Observe first that, by assuming the implication ‘‘success→ correctness (or truth)’’, one cannot do justice to the existence
of mutually incompatible successful systems of set theory (like ‘‘ZFC + large cardinal axioms’’ and ‘‘ZFC + V = L’’).
For correctness (truth) is commonly intended as a matter of all or nothing, ruling out the possibility of equally correct
(true) but mutually exclusive axiomatic systems. This would be the case, though, if evidence due to success were to imply
correctness (truth) in set theory. On the other hand, assuming the implication ‘‘success → correctness (or truth)’’ and
denying correctness or truth to, for example, ‘‘ZFC + V = L’’, one would ipso facto deny its mathematical success, which is
undeniable.
The success of the axiom of constructibility (V = L) is often regarded as a counterexample to the view that success is all
there is to correctness and truth in set theory.
A favorite example against the pragmatic view that we accept an axiom because of its elegance (simplicity) and
power (usefulness) is the constructibility hypothesis. It should be accepted according to the pragmatic view but is
not generally accepted as true [17, 196].
Wang suggests what would be necessary and sufficient conditions for an axiomatic system to be accepted (as correct or
true). Beyond being successful, the system should be explicitly suggested by the meaning of set.
[V = L] is likely to be false according to the iterative concept of set. Basically it is felt that the pragmatic view leaves
out the criterion of intuitive plausibility [17, 196].
Wang’s argument, however, does not apply to most large cardinal axioms and, especially, to the ones discussed byWoodin.
‘‘Correct’’ (‘‘true’’) principles such as Projective Determinacy, and the large cardinal axioms implying it, lack any clear direct
link to the iterative concept, whichWang calls upon for the meaning of set. In fact, referring to these axioms, and explicitly
describing them as ‘‘true’’, Woodin comments:
There are natural questions aboutH(ω1)which are not solvable from ZFC. However, there are axioms forH(ω1)which
resolve these questions [. . . ] andwhich are clearly true. But the truth of these axioms became evident only after a great
deal of work [18, 569].
Moreover, the implication ‘‘success and intuitive plausibility (adherence to the iterative concept)→ correctness (truth)’’
is also objectionable. For it can be plausibly suggested that the iterative concept is a concept that arose alongside successful
set-theoretic developments, and as such it is a metaphorical reformulation of the insights delivered by the latter.11 The
same holds for methodological maxims that are often presented as inspired by the iterative concept, such as, for example,
‘‘maximize’’, the view that the universe of sets should be high and wide, so ‘‘the more sets one proves to exist, the better’’.
9 For example, Projective Determinacy (PD), implied by the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals, is said in [18] to be ‘‘the correct axiom for
the projective sets’’, yielding forcing invariant answers to questions independent of ZFC (e.g., the measurability of projective sets), which, when first
formulated, were considered unsolvable. See [18], 570. By forcing invariance is here meant that no sentence in the language of second-order arithmetic, in
which properties of projective sets are formulated, can be shown to be independent of the existence of large cardinals implying PD by the method of set
forcing. In fact, by a theorem of Woodin, if you suppose that every set belongs to an iterable inner model satisfying ‘‘there are ωWoodin cardinals’’, then,
ifM and N are set-generic extensions of V , you have L(R)M ≡ L(R)N . See [18].
10 Second-order number theory and third-order number theory are presented in [18] as the theories of the structures < H(ω1),∈> and < H(ω2),∈>.
See [18] for details.
11 See [1] and [2].
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A mathematical concept could only be attached to the sentence ‘‘the universe is maximal’’ only after Scott’s result that
if a measurable cardinal exists then V ≠ L was obtained. Viewing the iterative concept and methodological principles
like ‘‘maximization’’ in this way leads one to reject Wang’s suggestion that ‘‘intuitive plausibility’’ (i.e., adherence to the
iterative concept or ‘‘maximization’’) is sufficient, in conjunction with success, to produce truth or correctness in set
theory. For, along with every system of set theory that turns out to be successful (according to Gödel’s characterization
of success), a distinguished concept of set and a system of preferred methodological maxims is likely to emerge.12 Since
competing successful systems of axioms exist in set theory, taking the conjunction ‘‘success and intuitive plausibility’’ to
imply correctness (or truth) would still leave one with mutually exclusive, correct (true) systems of axioms. This contrasts
with how the term correct (true) is meant to be used.
It is also worth noting that methodological maxims are very far from suggesting unique proposals for axiomatic
extensions of ZFC. For example, ‘‘maximization’’ may suggest the principle ‘‘there exists a j : V → V ’’, which is incompatible
with the Axiom of Choice, also in line with maximality considerations.13 The Inner Model Hypothesis, incompatible with large
cardinal axioms, offers yet another example of the ambiguity of the concept of ‘‘maximization’’ (see the next section).
Onemight still object to our criticism by asserting that success comes in degrees in set theory, making it possible to draw
a distinction between incompatible successful systems according to their degree of success, and suggest that it is only the
most successful set-theoretic system that deserves to be regarded as correct or true. That mathematical success comes in
degrees seems to be the case. According to Gödel’s characterization of success, in fact, the term ‘‘successful’’ is to be applied
to mathematical developments through which a link is established between formerly unrelated mathematical facts. A link
may consist in one theory’s enabling the interpretation of another in its own terms. Under these circumstances, the former
would reveal itself to be ‘‘more successful’’ than the latter. In fact, as an implication of Scott’s theorem, the universe L could
be seen as a proper subuniverse of V and studied ‘‘from within’’ V under large cardinal axioms, thereby convincing some of
the superior success of ‘‘ZFC + large cardinals’’ over ‘‘ZFC + V = L’’. Supposing ‘‘maximality’’ to be essentially a matter of
maximizing interpretative power, Steel says the following with regard to ZFC+ V = L:
In this light we can see why most set-theorists reject V = L as restrictive: adopting it restricts the interpretative
power of the language of set theory. The language of set theory as used by the believer of V = L can certainly be
translated into the language of set theory as used by the believer in measurable cardinals, via the translation φ → φL.
There is no translation in the other direction. While it is true that adopting V = L enables one to settle new formal
sentences, this is in fact a completely sterile move, because one settles φ by giving it the same interpretation as φL
which can be settled in anyone’s theory [16, 423].
Yet it remains that while one may accept that success comes in degrees, this is usually not the case as far as correctness
and truth are concerned. Accordingly, correctness (truth) might well be supposed to be an attribute of the ‘‘most successful
system of set theory’’, but this could not be done by arguing that correctness (truth) is an implication of success. The only
possible way for one to coherently say that a successful axiomatic system for sets is correct (true) seems to be that of
explicitly presenting one’s position as a deliberate act, an act based on the decision to attach correctness (truth) to success ‘‘at
the highest degree’’, as well as on a shared agreement as to what the most successful axiomatic system for sets currently is.
However, at present, there is no agreement among set-theorists as to what the most successful theory of sets is.14 Skeptical
positions on the status of large cardinal axioms have been expressed (see, e.g., [15]). Arguments like Steel’s, to the effect
that an interpretation of ‘‘ZFC+ V = L’’ in terms of ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’ is possible but not vice versa, have been
contested aswell. Jensen, for instance, maintains that the relation between ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’ and ‘‘ZFC+V = L’’
is one of mutual interpretability. For L itself can see the existence of ‘‘natural’’ models for large cardinal axioms if there are
such cardinals in V . As a consequence of Shoenfield’s Absoluteness Lemma, in fact, L and V have transitive countable models
for the same large cardinal hypotheses.15 ‘‘Hence we could just assume ourselves to be in a countable segment of L when
we assume H ’’.16
To sum up: the view that success furnishes evidence for correctness (truth), though not per se contradictory, does not
help in defending the view that the program formaking our picture of the universemore determinatemust consist in finding
suitable extensions of ‘‘ZFC + large cardinal axioms’’. At most it suggests that one should be cautious in taking as correct
(true)what one regards as themost successful axiomatic system for sets, as there exist views about success that run contrary
to one’s own.
Let us add that, in fact, neither a simple identification of correctness (truth) with success, nor the view that correctness
(truth) is conventionally attached to success ‘‘at the highest degree’’, seems to underlie positions likeWoodin’s. A Platonistic
12 This view is presented and motivated in [2].
13 This point is made in [11]. The principle ‘‘there exists a j : V → V ’’ (there is a nontrivial elementary embedding of the universe into itself) was proved
to be contradictory with Choice by Kunen. See [12] for details.
14 Nor is there, one may guess, on the ‘‘conventional’’ view of correctness and truth introduced here.
15 In fact, if the hypothesis H holds in V , then by reflection H should have a model that is a level Vκ of V (note this informal step in the argument) for
some cardinal κ . By the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, there is a countable elementary submodel of Vκ , call it N , in which H holds. ByMostowski’s Collapsing
Theorem there is a transitive N that is a countable model of H . Let be a ∈ R be a code for N . The formula asserting the existence of such an a is Σ12 . By
Shoenfield’s Absoluteness Lemma, it is true in L. That is, L sees the existence of a transitive countable set model for H .
16 Quoted with permission from the handout of a talk given by Jensen in Krakow in 1999.
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attitude appears to be at work. This is explicitly admitted by Foreman in [4]; with regard to consistency results involving
large cardinal axioms, he observes:
This type of unifying deep structure is taken as strong evidence that the axioms proposed reflect some underlying
reality and so is often cited as a primary reason for accepting the existence of large cardinals [4, x].
Under these circumstances, correctness (truth) rests no longer on success. Success may well be regarded as a clue to it—if it
is supposed that it is correctness (truth), meant as a matter of ‘‘reflecting some underlying reality’’, that ultimately implies
success (or, better, success ‘‘at the highest degree’’). Moreover, by regarding correctness (truth) as sufficient, as opposed to
necessary, to success, an explanation would be given, too, for the existence of mutually exclusive successful systems of set
theory. For, under these circumstances, the existence of successful set theories that cannot be said to be correct (true) is no
longer contradictory. However, one should still justify Platonism in order for this position to be sound. This is no easy task.
Neither pursuing this justification nor criticizing it belongs to the aims of the present paper.
Having focused on the positions of Woodin, Steel, and Foreman, let us now return to Shelah’s views. Here one abdicates
the search for new axioms that may yield solutions to questions independent of ZFC, solutions to which correctness or
truth can be attached as the end-stage of a process through which a shared consensus is reached that certain mathematical
developments, and the axioms that make them possible, are the most successful ones. This abdication may have positive
consequences. It may work as a heuristic for exploiting the available resources (ZFC), to the effect that light is shed
on still undiscovered implications of them, perhaps relevant with regard to independence phenomena. Shelah’s pcf
theory, developed entirely within ZFC, has a bearing on questions of cardinal arithmetic like the Generalized Continuum
Hypothesis.17 However, it might be felt that whereas positions like Shelah’s are supported by the existence of incompatible
successful set-theoretical developments, they also prescribe a halt to such developments by regarding ZFC as all there is to
be said about sets. Shelah’s conclusions also sound arbitrary. Why should the view that a universe of ZFC be not like ‘‘the
Sun’’ but like ‘‘a human being of some fixed nationality’’ be a definitive one? Why not regard it as a description of a state
of affairs that need not be permanent, merely reflecting the actual situation in set theory, where no development stands
out as the most successful (and hence, one may add, the correct or true) one? As it seems premature to say that convincing
evidence is available that the correct answer to the question ‘‘Is CH true/false?’’ is given by a suitable extension of ‘‘ZFC +
large cardinal axioms’’, so seems it premature to rule this out and be content with the view that the notion universe of all
sets is inherently undetermined.
As a case study supporting the above criticisms, we discuss the second author’s Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) in the
following section. The IMH also provides a striking example of a phenomenon alluded to above, the ambiguity of the concept
of ‘‘maximization’’.
5. The Inner Model Hypothesis
We begin with a restatement of our thesis. Objections can be raised against the view that the notion universe of all sets
can only be made determinate by finding axiomatic extensions of ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’ which successfully decide
questions independent of the latter. In advancing this view, it is assumed that mathematical success provides evidence for
the correctness or truth of large cardinal axioms, which renders these axioms definitive set-theoretic principles that one
can only ‘‘extend’’ but not contradict. In assuming that success implies correctness (truth), however, one is either tacitly
committed to Platonism or one faces the embarrassing situation that mutually exclusive and successful axiomatic systems
for sets coexist. On the other hand, no a priori ground seems to exist for ruling out the possibility of making the notion
universe of all setsmore determinate than it is now through the introduction of new axiomatic proposals.
By advancing the IMH, one de facto remains open to the possibility of making the universe of sets more determinate. At
the same time, one does not impose the restriction of consistency with ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’. The approach of the
IMH is not to ‘‘determine’’ the universe by directly postulating what sets exist in it (which is done when, for example, large
cardinals are assumed to exist in V ), but to state from a metatheoretical perspective what properties the universe of sets is
supposed to possess.
Let us discuss the hypothesis in more detail. How can metatheoretical properties be identified which one may wish the
universe V of sets to have? The suggestion made in [5] is that one should start from ZFC (or from a theory for sets and
classes like Gödel–Bernays) and provisionally regard V as a model for it endowed with countably many sets (and classes).
For a countable universe V , many techniques are available for creating not only inner universes of V but also outer universes
of V , i.e., universes V ∗ such that V ⊆ V ∗, to which V can be compared. These techniques not only include (set and class)
forcing, but also methods that arise from further generalizations of the forcing method (such as hyperclass forcing) or from
infinitarymodel theory. Being able to compare V to amultitude of other universes enables one to better formulate properties
that one wishes the intended universe V to obey. The IMH takes advantage of this method of comparison.
If a statement φ without parameters holds in an inner universe of some outer universe of V (i.e., in some universe compatible
with V ), then it already holds in some inner universe of V .
17 See [15], 220: ‘‘Cardinal arithmetic is loaded with consistency results because we ask the wrong questions. [. . . ]. We should replace cardinality by
cofinality, as explained below (pcf theory)’’.
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Equivalently, statements that are internally consistent with respect to an outer universe of V are already internally
consistent in V , where a statement is internally consistent if it holds in some inner universe. It follows that by enlarging
V one gains nothing as far as internal consistency is concerned. So, according to the IMH, V is maximal with respect to
internal consistency.18
Although the IMH is formulated by supposing V to be countable, it can also be formulated as a (weaker) hypothesis for
an uncountable V . This is done by restricting the notion of outer universe to the set-generic and class-generic extensions of
the given universe that preserve the Gödel–Bernays axioms, thereby reducing the hypothesis to a principle of ordinary class
theory. Alternatively, one may regard the IMH as saying that, although V itself is not countable, it should satisfy sentences
that are true in countable universes which are maximal with respect to internal consistency. It is also worth noting that
having the universe maximize internal consistency via the IMH generalizes a phenomenon known to hold for formulas
(without parameters) proved to be consistent by set forcing.19
One knows a lot about the consistency strength of the IMH. It is established by the following results.20 (1) Assume that
there is aWoodin cardinal and a larger inaccessible cardinal. Then there are universes whichmaximize internal consistency,
so the IMH is consistent. (2) The IMH implies that there are inner models with measurable cardinals of arbitrarily large
Mitchell order.
Note that, by adopting the IMH, while not extending ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinal axioms’’, one does appeal to large cardinals in
two respects. First, large cardinal axioms are invoked for establishing its consistency strength. This acknowledges the major
feature of themathematical success of large cardinal axioms, their ability to prove consistency. The relevance of these axioms
is seen here asmetamathematical rather than asmathematical. Second, one asks whether the IMH has relevant implications
with regard to large cardinals. This is in fact the case. Among the consequences of the IMH is that no inaccessibles, hence
no large cardinals, exist in V and that the real numbers are not closed under the ♯ operation. That is to say, not only is the
IMH not an extension of the system ‘‘ZFC+ large cardinals’’, it is also incompatible with it! The consistency of large cardinal
axioms is however preserved under the IMH (V sees inner models for them); it is only their existence that is contradicted.
This latter point also has important consequences for the methodological notion of ‘‘maximization’’. The IMH clearly
asserts a maximal property of the universe of sets, namely that internal consistency has been maximized. But it is at the
same time in conflict with the existence of large cardinals. This is despite the fact that large cardinal axioms have also been
traditionally assumed to assert a form of maximality for the universe of sets. Let us return to Gödel:
From an axiom in some sense opposite to [V = L], the negation of Cantor’s conjecture could perhaps be derived. I am
thinking of an axiomwhich . . .would state somemaximum property of the system of all sets, whereas [V = L] states a
minimum property. Note that only amaximum property would seem to harmonize with the concept of set. [8, 262-3]
Note that there is no implication in this quote that ‘‘maximization’’ must be based on large cardinal axioms. And, indeed,
the IMH provides an alternative way of maximizing the universe of sets, thereby revealing the profound ambiguity of this
concept.
What about questions which are independent from ZFC? Some of them are decided under the IMH, e.g., the Singular
Cardinal Hypothesis and the existence of a projective non-measurable set of reals, which turn out to be true, and the
existence of a Borel bijection between any two non-Borel analytic sets, which, instead, turns out to be false.21 The Continuum
Hypothesis remains undecided, though. For, suppose that V satisfies the IMH. One can create, by set forcing, a larger universe
V [G], in which the CH is true (using a ‘‘Lévy collapse’’). Since V is contained in V [G], the IMH is also true in V [G]. So the
hypothesis is consistent with the CH. It cannot imply its negation. Similarly, one can create a larger universe V [H] in which
the CH is false (by adding ℵ2 Cohen reals), the IMH being true in V [H]. So the IMH cannot imply the CH either. One needs
a stronger version of the IMH to settle the CH, i.e., the hypothesis for formulas with globally absolute parameters.22 A
consistency proof for the resulting Strong Inner Model Hypothesis (SIMH) is however still lacking.
Let us conclude with a bold question. Will the Inner Model Hypothesis, and its implications, be accepted as a definitive
feature of the universe, making it more determinate than it is now? According to the views presented throughout this paper,
the considerable mathematical success of the IMH is to play a decisive role in this respect, whether or not one deliberately
decides to attach correctness (truth) to the most successful set-theoretic hypotheses. But the philosophical implications of
the IMH are clear, as it presents an important challenge to two widely shared views in contemporary set theory.
18 To put it in other terms, if L = language of set/class theory and, for a universeW , Φ(W ) = all sentences of L which are true in some inner universe of
W , then, under the IMH, if V ⊆ W thenΦ(V ) = Φ(W ).
19 See [5] for the details of this claim.
20 See [6].
21 Theorem 15 in [5] proves that the IMH implies the existence of a real R such that ZFC fails in Lα[R] for all ordinals α. This property implies that (a) for
some real R,ℵ1 =ℵL[R]1 , which in turn implies that (b) for some real R, R♯ does not exist, which is equivalent to (c): for some real R, Jensen’s covering property
holds relative to L[R] (i.e., every uncountable set of ordinals is a subset of a set in L[R] of the same size). The truth of the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis and
the Singular Square Principle and the falsity of the existence of a Borel-isomorphism of non-Borel analytic sets (via the results presented in [9]) follow from
(c), while the existence of a projective non-measurable set of reals (via the results in [14]) follows from (a).
22 See [5].
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